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PRELIMINARY
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the evolution of women in the labor market, specifically their post-
World War II employment, wages and education, by assessing the role of technology
changing labor demand requirements, as a driving force. The empirical results in the
United Sates data show that job requirements have shifted from more physical to more
intellectual attributes. Moreover, women have always worked in occupations with rel-
atively low physical requirements and, traditionally, also worked in occupations with
lower intellectual requirements than men. However, the later trend has been reversed
over time with women overtaking men in college education by the mid 1980s. This
paper uses a model in which agents make work and education decisions to account for
the importance of technological shifts in women’s labor market experience. The key fea-
ture of the model is that individuals are heterogenous in their innate brain and brawn
abilities, and women have on average less brawn than men. This is the main source for
the employment, wage and education gaps in the 1950s between men and women. The
general equilibrium model is simulated to account for the quantitative implications of
brain biased technical change (BBTC), which is modeled as a rise in the share parameter
on the brain factor in a CES production function, from 1950 to 2005. In particular, as
BBTC favors women’s comparative advantage in brain over brawn, the model is able to
generate a large rise in female participation, closing gender wage and education gaps, in
addition to a rising college premium. These results suggest that labor demand changes
and multidimensional skill attributes are important in explaining the radical evolution
of women’s labor market participation, wages and education.
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1 Introduction
One of the greatest phenomena of the 20th century has been the rise in female labor force
participation. Using evidence from United States data, this study develops a general equilibrium
model based on the following three facts of women’s labor market experience since World War II:
1. Female labor force participation: Married women’s labor force participation, aged 25 to 64,
rose from 25 percent in 1950 to 70 percent in 2005. Single women’s labor force participation
rose by roughly 15 percent, while men’s labor force participation stayed fairly steady.
2. Gender wage gap: The gender wage gap, defined as average female to male wages, remained
fairly steady around 60 percent until the mid 1970s, but by 2005 it had reached about 77
percent (figure 2(a), left panel).
3. Education: The fraction of women with a college degree rose substantially during this time
period. In the 1950s, for every college-educated women, there were about two college-educated
men. Women started to catch up with men in the mid 1960s and by the late 1980s the gap had
disappeared (figure 2(b), right panel). Today, the gap is reversed with more women graduating
from college than men.
While macroeconomists have extensively studied the rise in female labor force participation,1
and the education gap2 the evolution of female wages has remained largely unexplored. Since wage
divergences and increases over the last decades are explained by emphasizing education, human
capital and intellectual abilities,3 the goal of this paper is to explore how much of these three
phenomena can be explained by a simple demand side story focusing on human capital and physical
labor.
Empirical economic studies have found various important factors shaping women’s labor market
experience, such as changes in women’s work experience, education, and occupational mix (see, for
example, Black and Juhn, 2000; Blau, 1998; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2005). In addition, the rise of
female labor force participation has been the focus of recent macroeconomic research. Complimen-
tary to the theory presented in this paper, studies argue that improvements in home technology, such
as the invention and marketization of household appliances (see, for example, Greenwood, Seshadri,
and Yorukoglu, 2002, and references therein), or the improvements in baby formulas (see Albanesi
and Olivetti, 2006), enabled women to enter the labor market. While improvements in home technol-
ogy freed women from time-consuming household chores, theories only focused on home technology
improvements do not effectively address the evolution of the gender wage and education gap. Two
recent studies focus on the effects of cultural, social, and intergenerational learning on female labor
supply (see Fernández, 2007; Fogli and Veldkamp, 2007). As before, these models are successful
in explaining part of the rise in female labor force participation. In addition, Fogli and Veldkamp
(2007) extend their theory to explain the evolution of wages through women’s self-selection bias, i.e.,
the characteristics of working women changed in the 20th century. However, this model is unable
to match the complete wage evolution, only matching either the initial stagnation or the later rise
in relative female to male wages.
Nonetheless, the hypothesis of changing technological progress and closing of the gender wage
gap has been analyzed in some econometric studies with varying conclusions. Wong (2006) finds
1See for example Albanesi and Olivetti (2006); Fernández (2007); Fogli and Veldkamp (2007); Greenwood and
Guner (2009); Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003); Olivetti (2006).
2See for example Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2002); Yang and Ge (2008).
3See for example Becker (1994); Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993).
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Figure 1: Women’s Market Trends
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that skill-biased technical change had a similar impact on men’s and women’s wages and, therefore,
cannot explain the closing wage gap. Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) quantify the contribution of
changes in specific job tasks on the closing wage gap from 1979 to 1999 for West Germany. The
authors find that skill-biased technical change in West Germany, especially through the adoption of
computers, can explain about 41 percent of the closing wage gap. While these two studies estimate
the effects of relative labor demand changes on the wage gap, both assume an inelastic labor supply.
Consequently, they cannot address the non-linear path of average female to male wages stemming
from women’s self-selection bias into the labor market and changing education choices over time.
To summarize, while previous studies have been successful in explaining the rise in female
labor force, they say little about the closing gender wage gap or the reversal in education trends.
One unexplored fact, changing labor demand requirements due to technological progress, could
potentially explain some of the observed wage and education trends. More specifically, in this paper,
evidence from the United States points to labor requirement trends supporting an explanation of
technological change favoring women. Thus, a simple general equilibrium model is developed, where
women’s improved labor market experience is driven by labor demand changes. The main factor in
improving women’s labor market opportunities, their potential wages, and their returns to education
is the shift in labor factors away from brawn, as similarly suggested by Galor and Weil (1996) and
supported by data evidence (see for example Bacolod and Blum, 2005). In doing so, the goal is to
provide a driving force for observed labor market changes that previously have been taken as given
in the study of female labor force participation. For example, Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003) successfully explain a large rise in participation by an exogenously closing wage gap and
Olivetti (2006) does so with an exogenous increase in returns to experience for women. The shift in
labor requirements is modeled here by a linear exogenous “skill-biased” technical change, where skill
is defined as intellectual abilities (“brain"). This contrasts to the traditional literature on SBTC
which distinguishes skill on an educational dimension (e.g., high or low, college or non-college). A
similar alternative explanation of SBTC has previously been used by Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009)
in explaining the rise between and within wage inequality in the United States since 1970. The
authors focus on men and on the human capital accumulation decision over the life-cycle. This paper
abstracts from a life-cycle approach and only allows individuals to educate when young. I make this
simplification since the focus here is in explaining gender differences in participation, college degrees
and average wages, and does not focus on inequality across and within groups. The deviation from
the traditional education-based skill classification and the introduction of a second dimension of
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skill, brawn, is a key feature of the model in creating different labor market opportunities for men
and women. Agents are heterogenous in innate brain and brawn levels, and therefore, depending
on current wages, differ in their willingness to work in the labor market or spend time on home
production. Moreover, when young and deciding on obtaining a college education, individuals take
into account future expected wages, which depend on the market price of brain and brawn. It is
assumed that the only cost of obtaining higher education is a utility cost, which depends on an
agent’s innate brain with higher ability individuals facing a lower cost. Since, most of the rise in
female labor force participation has been for married women, as in Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003), agents are randomly assigned to married or single life after the education decision has taken
place. In addition, as previous research has found (see for example Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos,
2002), women acquire additional education even if labor market returns are low in order to find a
more educated (high earning) spouse. In this paper, the random marriage assignment allows for
assortative matching on education, giving women an additional incentive to become educated.
In this model, women with a high earning spouse tend to stay out of the labor market when the
returns to brawn are relative high (or the returns to brain are low), thus obtaining ceteris paribus
less education (assortative matching might induce more education). Moreover, if the difference in
brawn between men and women is sufficiently large, women who do work will, in general, have
lower wages. With a fall in the returns to brawn and a rise in the returns to brain, women will be
favored by their comparative advantage in brain, and will catch up in employment levels, wages and
education with men. Moreover, women might surpass men in educational attainment, given their
comparative advantage or greater dependence on brain for higher wages.
On the demand side, production is modeled as an aggregate constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function as in Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009), where brain and brawn are the
inputs. Brain-biased technical change (BBTC) occurs starting in the 1950s, given the empirical
evidence presented in section 2, unlike the traditional literature on SBTC which usually starts
around the 1970s. I present results where agents are myopic and have perfect foresight, but in
neither case do they anticipate BBTC until after 1950. Again, this CES specification, rather then
the traditional low and high education specification, is important to model the wedge between men
and women. Since individuals always supply both types of skills, everyone gains from the rise in
brain wages and everyone looses from the rise in brawn prices. However, high brain people gain
more from the rising brain price, while high brawn people (mostly men) loose more from the fall
in brawn wages. This feature produces a rich set of dynamics, that are able to generate not only a
convergence in female and male labor market outcomes because of a rise in female wages, but also
a fall in uneducated male wages as observed in the U.S. since the mid 1970s.
The model is calibrated to the match 1950 U.S. data moments. The BBTC mechanism developed
in this paper is able to explain: (1) a large rise in female labor force participation, (2) first a
stagnation in average female to male wages, (3) a closing wage gap starting in the mid 1970s, and
(4) a similar reversal in the education gap as depicted in figure 2(b), right panel.
While the empirical results are specific to the United States, the model developed could also
be used to study cross-country differences in women’s labor market participation. Rogerson (2005)
notes that the change in relative employment of women and the aggregate service share (a brain-
intensive sector given data evidence) between 1985 and 2000 are highly correlated at 0.82, concluding
that countries which added the most jobs to the service sector also closed the employment gap the
most.
As labor demand changes are the key motivation for this study, Section 2 provides further
evidence for the changing labor market, focusing on the evolution of physical and intellectual job
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requirements in the United States and women’s self-selection into low-strength jobs. The general
equilibrium model is outlined in Section 3, and Section 4 provides analytical results of BBTC
on labor demand, labor supply, wages, and education. Section 5 discusses the estimation and
calibration procedure, and Section 6 presents labor market trends resulting from a linear exogenous
BBTC starting in the 1950s. Lastly, Section 7 concludes.
2 United States Labor Facts
To explore the relationship between the rise in female labor force participation and changes in
labor demand, this study focuses on the relative demand and supply of two types of labor inputs:
brains and brawn. This study starts from the premise that women have, on average, less brawn than
men. Accepting that women and men have similar levels of brain, men have a comparative advantage
in brawn-intensive occupations. However, technological change shifts labor demand toward low-
brawn occupations diminishing men’s comparative advantage in the labor market.
Using factor analysis, I obtain brain and brawn estimates by United States census occupation
and industry classifications from the 1977 Dictionary of Occupational Title (DOT).4 The 1977 DOT
reports 38 job characteristics for over 12,000 occupations, documenting (1) general educational de-
velopment, (2) specific vocational training, (3) aptitudes required of a worker, (4) temperaments
or adaptability requirements, (5) physical strength requirements, and (6) environmental conditions.
For example, general educational development measures the formal and informal educational at-
tainment required to preform a job effectively by rating reasoning, language and mathematical
development. Each reported level is primarily based on curricula taught in the United States,
where the highest mathematical level is advanced calculus, and the lowest level only requires basic
operations, such as adding and subtracting two-digit numbers. Specific vocational preparation is
measured in the number of years a typical employee requires to learn the job tasks essential to
perform at an average level. Eleven aptitudes required of a worker (e.g., general intelligence, motor
coordination, numerical ability) are rated on a five point scale, with the first level being the top ten
percent of the population and the fifth level compromising the bottom ten percent of the population.
Ten temperaments required of a worker are reported in the 1977 DOT, where the temperament type
is reported without any numerical rating. An example of a temperament is the ability to influence
people in their opinions or judgments. Physical requirements include a measure of strength required
on the job, rated on a five point scale from sedentary to very heavy, and the presence or absence
of tasks such as climbing, reaching, or kneeling. Lastly, environmental conditions measure occupa-
tional exposure (presence or absence) to environmental conditions, such as extreme heat, cold, and
noise. I use factor analysis similarly to Ingram and Neumann (2006) to reduce the dimensionality of
DOT job characteristics. Using factor analysis, a linear relationship between normally distributed
broad skill categories (e.g., brain, brawn, motor coordination) and the 38 DOT characteristics is
estimated from the associated 38 variable correlation matrix. For a detailed explanation of the
estimation procedure see Appendix A.
Using maximum likelihood estimation methods, three factors are determined sufficient in cap-
turing the information contained in the 38 DOT characteristics. Given the estimated coefficients
4I also estimate factors using the 1991 DOT code, with very similar results. Unfortunately, the nature of factor
analysis makes a direct comparision between the two surveys unfeasible, given that occupational requirements are
only compared to the average in the sample.
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(factor loadings) I term these factors: brain, brawn, and motor coordination (see Appendix A Ta-
ble A.1). These factors are merged with the 1950 and 1960 United States Census data and the
1968 to 2005 Current Population Survey (CPS) data to compute trends over time.5 Note that for
illustrative purposes and estimation in later sections, brain and brawn factors are normalized from
zero to one (lowest to highest), i.e., we can think of occupations with zero as using zero percent
of a factor and one as using 100 percent of a factor. Figure 2, which plots occupational brain and
brawn combinations weighted by 1950 Census employed population, clearly depicts the difference
in brain and brawn requirements across the economy. While, figure 3 shows the 2005 CPS weighted
occupational brain and brawn requirements, which are shifted to the right (more brain) and the
bottom (less brawn) compared to 1950.
To compute aggregate factor demand changes in the United States over time, 1977 occupation-
industry factor estimates are aggregated using United States Census and CPS civilian labor force
weights. Figure 4 depicts aggregate factor standard deviations. While motor coordination remains
fairly constant over time, the brain supply steadily increases and the brawn supply steadily decreases.
This rising trend in the supply of brain versus the falling trend in the supply of brawn is what I term
BBTC. These trends are not specific to the 1977 DOT, since I obtain similar results for 1991 DOT,
as do Ingram and Neumann (2006) (see Figure 3 in the referenced paper). Note that using a single
DOT survey to determine job requirements implies that the specific job factor requirements did not
change over the last five decades. For example, a craftsman utilized the same brawn level in 1950
as in 2005. Ergo, all trends pictured are due to changes in the composition (mix) of occupations
within the economy, and the rise in brain and fall in brawn requirements might possibly be greater
than shown due to intra occupation skill-biased technical changes.
Figure 5 depicts brain and brawn standard deviations by gender over time, with the selection
of women into low-brawn occupations clearly evident. Given women’s lower innate brawn levels,
this bias toward low brawn occupations can be either due to employee self-selection or employer
discrimination. Additionally, the total brain supply has risen continuously since the 1950s, with
women’s brain supply surpassing men’s by the 1980s. This trend could possibly be linked with
increased educational investment.
Given the above facts, I argue that beginning in the 1950s women entered the labor market and
their average wages improved due to the rise of brain-intensive occupations, which complemented
women’s comparative advantage.
5Census and CPS data is obtained from the IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Sobek, Alexander, Fitch, Goeken, Hall, King,
and Ronnander, 2004) and the IPUMS-CPS project (King, Ruggles, Alexander, Leicach, and Sobek, 2004). The
IPUMS projects provide a consistent 1950 United States Census classification of occupations and industries over the
years, which is used in merging 1977 DOT brain and brawn factors.
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Figure 2: Brain and Brawn Job Combinations from the 1977 DOT with 1950 Census Labor Shares
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Figure 3: Brain and Brawn Job Combinations from the 1977 DOT with 2005 Census Labor Shares
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Figure 4: Standard Deviations of Labor Input Supply Over Time
0	  
0.1	  
0.2	  
0.3	  
0.4	  
0.5	  
0.6	  
1950	   1955	   1960	   1965	   1970	   1975	   1980	   1985	   1990	   1995	   2000	   2005	  
Fa
ct
or
	  D
ev
ia
,
on
s	  
Brain	  
Coordina5on	  
Brawn	  
Figure 5: Standard Deviation of Labor Input Supply by Gender
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3 Toy Model
The underlying forces of the model simulated in Section 6, are best demonstrated in a simplified
partial equilibrium version. Assume there is a unit measure of men and women, who are all single
and live for two periods. The one-period utility function is,
u(ct) = ct, (1)
where ct = max{wt, Ah}, that is agents choose between working and earning wage wt or staying at
home and consuming home production Ah. Wages are a function of an agent’s innate brain and
brawn, that is wt = wb,tbi+wr,tri. Let all men have brawn rm, and all women have brawn rf < rm,
while brain is distributed identically for men and women by b ∼ U [bh, bl]. Furthermore, assume that
wb,tbl + wr,tr
m ≥ Ah, but wb,tbl + wr,trf < Ah, that is, all men work, while women only work if,
bi ≥ Ah − wr,tr
f
wb,t
≡ bˆft . (2)
3.1 Labor Supply and Wages
Given the above assumptions, men’s labor force participation equals one and women’s equals,
LFP ft =
∫ bh
bˆft
dF (b) =
bh − bˆft
bh − bl . (3)
Thinking of BBTC as a rise in wb,twr,t . Clearly, a rise in wb,t (a fall in wr,t) will lead to a fall in bˆ
f
t and
a rise in female employment given all previous assumptions still hold, i.e., BBTC leads to a closing
employment gap.
Average female wages are then,
wft = wb,tE(b
f ) + wr,tr
f = .5
(
wb,tbh + wr,tr
f +Ah
)
, (4)
where E(bf ) is the average brain supply conditional on the working population,
E(bf ) =
∫ bh
bˆft
b dF (b)
LFP ft
= .5
(
bh + bˆ
f
t
)
. (5)
Similarly, male wages are,
wmt = wb,tE(b
m) + wr,tr
f = .5wb,t (bh + bl) + wr,tr
m, (6)
where E(bm) = .5 (bh + bl) given that all men work.
3.2 Evolution of the Wage Gap with BBTC
Given wages and average brain supply there are two facts that will govern the evolution of the
gender wage gap with BBTC. In addition, given that there has been a sharp rise in education, likely
affecting brain supplies, an additional education effect arises when adding and education choice
into the model. Therefore, the wage gap will evolve non-linearly over time, even if BBTC is rising
linearly, given the interaction of,
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1. The Price Effect : women benefit more (loose less) from falling brawn wages wr,t
2. The Supply Effect : lower ability women will enter the market
3. The Education Effect : non-working women have no incentive to obtain education. However,
once more women enter the labor market they will be more likely then men to obtain education,
increasing average brain supplies disproportionally for women.
The price effect follows from taking the derivate of wgt with respect to wb,t and wr,t.
∂wmt
∂wr,t
= rm and
∂wft
∂wr,t
= .5rf (7)
Since, .5rf < rm a fall in wr,t will close the gender wage gap. Moreover,
∂wmt
∂wb,t
= .5 (bh + bl) > 0, and
∂wft
∂wb,t
= .5bh > 0, (8)
both men and women’s wages grow with a rise in wb,t, however, the rise is smaller for women,
because of the supply effect
∂E(bm)
∂wb,t
= 0, and
∂E(bf )
∂wb,t
= −.5 bˆ
f
t
wb,t
< 0, (9)
that is, lower ability women (lower brain) enter the market with a rise in brain returns. To summa-
rize, the supply effect will lead to a widening gender wage gap with BBTC, while the price effect
will close the gender wage gap. Lastly, to analyze the education effect we need to introduce the
education decision, benefit and cost. Assume that individuals decide to attend college to increase
their innate brain ability by a factor e in the first period. Attending college results in a utility cost
η and college students cannot work in the labor market. The college education decision for a male
i, assuming discounting of β and constant wage rates, is,
β (wbbie+ wrr
m)− η ≥ (1 + β) (wbbi + wrrm) , (10)
or men study if and only if,
bi ≥ η + wrr
m
wb (β(e− 1)− 1) ≡ b
e (rm) . (11)
Men become educated if the increased wages in the second period due to e, can compensate for
the lost wages when young and the utility cost. If all women worked, women would have a similar
cut-off
be
(
rf
)
< be (rm) ,
since forgone earnings are smaller, rf < rm. However, since some women remain home if rf is low
enough
b˜e
(
rf , Ah
)
> be (rm) ,
less women than men will obtain education in an economy that uses mostly brawn in production.
Therefore, a fall in brawn returns or a rise in brain returns will eventually lead to a reversal in the
education gap between gender, leading ultimately to reverse the supply effect and a closing wage
gap.
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In summary, the price and education effect will close the wage gap, while the supply effect will
widen the wage gap. The supply effect will dominate when women’s labor force participation is
considerably lower than men’s and education levels are low, but will slowly disappear as labor force
participation and education rates converge. Therefore, the natural evolution of these effects will
initially cause a fall, or stagnation, of average female to male wages, which will close as the price
and education effect begin to dominate.
These analytical results suggest that a model differentiating between brain and brawn labor
requirements should replicate the initial United States employment, education, and wage differences
across gender. Moreover, it should reproduce the subsequent evolution of the female labor force
participation rate, college attainment, and the gender wage gap, including some initial stagnation in
average female wages as observed during the 1960s and 1970s and a reversal of education attainments
as in the mid 1980s.
4 General Equilibrium Model
The simulated economy consists of a unit measure of males and females, who at age 1 either wed
or remain single forever. Agents, are endowed with brain and brawn, which they supply jointly to
the labor market. These two labor inputs are aggregated to a final market good, which is consumed
by households. Agents live and work until age N . At age 0, individuals can choose to attend college
and, therefore, increase their innate brain ability. During college enrollement agents forgo earnings
and pay a one time utility cost. Lastly, agents choose to work in the labor market or the home, and
substitute consumption between market and home produced goods.
4.1 Marriage
After the education decision has been made (at age 1), individuals are either married or remain
single until age N . Marriage is determined by chance, but varies with educational attainment.
That is, age 1 educated women at time t marry with probability pfe,t and uneducated women marry
with probability pfu,t. Moreover, there is assortative matching in education, i.e., the probability
that an educated woman marries an educated man, is strictly greater than marrying an uneducated
man, pfe,e?,t > p
f
e,u?,t and p
f
e,e?,t + p
f
e,u?,t = 1. Similarly, for uneducated women probabilities statisfy
pfu,e?,t < p
f
u,u?,t and p
f
u,e?,t + p
f
u,u?,t = 1. If a fraction λ
f
t of age 1 women and λmt of men is educated
at time t for a consistent equilibrium. Males marriage probabilities are,
pme,t =
λft p
f
e,tp
f
e,e?,t + (1− λft )pfupfu,e?,t
λmt
,
pmu,t =
λft p
f
e,tp
f
e,u?,t + (1− λft )pfupfu,u?,t
1− λmt
,
pme,e?,t =
λft p
f
e,tp
f
e,e?,t
λft p
f
e,tp
f
e,e?,t + (1− λft )pfupfe,u?,t
,
pmu,e?,t =
λft p
f
e,tp
f
u,e?,t
λft p
f
e,tp
f
u,e?,t + (1− λft )pfupfu,u?,t
,
pme,u?,t = 1− pme,e?,t and pmu,u?,t = 1− pmu,e?,t.
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4.2 Preferences
Given evidence on the intensive and extensive margin of labor supply,6 it is assumed that agents
can either work full-time in the labor market or not at all, `i = {0, 1} for agent i. Moreover,
given evidence on household consumption7 it is assumed that market and home produced goods are
imperfect substitutes. To summarize a married household maximizes is,
Up(ct, ht) =
((
ct − c
φ
)ζ
+
(
ht
φ
)ζ)1/ζ
. (12)
subject to a standard budget constraint, the home production technology, and a time constraint,
ct ≤ ωmt `mt + ωft `ft (13)
ht = Ah
(
1− `mt + 1− `ft
)
(14)
0 ≤ `mt , `ft ≤ 1, (15)
where the superscripts m, f stand for male, female, 11−ζ is the elasticity of substitution between
market and home goods, 0 < φ < 2 is an economy of scale parameter in marriage, and c is a
consumption subsistence level. The consumptions subsistence level, is necessary to account for the
fact that in 1950 married educated and uneducated women had similar labor supply.8 Note, agent
i earns the wage ωi,t = ψ(bi,t, ri,t, ei), a function of his/her innate brain and brawn abilities and
their educational attainment ei. By assumption men and women are perfect substitutes in home
production, and, therefore, spouses specialize with the higher wage earner entering the labor market
first. Moreover, given a positive subsistence level c > 0, the primary earner will always work, while
the secondary work works if,
w2t >
((
w1t
)ζ
+Aζh
) 1
ζ − w1t (16)
or
w1t < c. (17)
Single agents solve a similar maximization problem. However, since given the subsistence require-
ments and the discrete labor decision, single agents would always have to work in this model. To
make the model consistent with the data, it is therefore, assumed that with probability ps ≥ 0
some agents have the option of staying at home. We can think of this, as the government provid-
ing benefits equal to the subsistence requirements for a random fraction of agents or some singles
having other means of covering the subsistence requirements by, e.g., living with their parents, etc.
Therefore, a fraction 1− ps of single agents has to work, while a fraction ps works if and only if
wji,t −
c
φ
≥ Ah for all j = {m, f}, (18)
6Single employed women worked nearly 40 hours per week in 1950 and slightly less than 40 hours per week in
2005, while married women worked about 38 hours per week both in 1950 and 2005.
7See for example McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997); Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright (1995); Aguiar and
Hurst (2006); Chang and Schorfheide (2003); Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright (1995).
8About 37 percent of married educated women and 25 percent of married uneducated women worked in 1950.
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where the subsistence requirements is adjusted for the economies of scales, φ. That is, single
households have to cover less expenditure than a married household, but not necessarily half of the
amount, given economies of scale in marriage. The one-period utility of a single household i is,
Us(ct, ht) = (1− ps) max
{
wji,t −
c
φ
,Ah
}
+ ps
(
wji,t −
c
φ
)
. (19)
4.3 Education
Assume that individuals choose education when young (at age 0) and single. Education requires
to forgo earnings at age 0 and a utility cost η1b
η2
i , but increases innate brain ability by a factor of
e, i.e., bi,e = bie. The utility cost is decreasing in an individual’s innate brain, bi, i.e., η2 < 0 and
η1 > 0, making it more difficult to enter college the lower one’s innate brain. Suppressing subscripts
for heterogeneity in brain and brawn, let V m,1p,e,e? (V
m,1
p,e,u?) denote the value function of a educated
man married to an educated (uneducated) woman at age 1. While, V g,1s,j is the value function when
single for an individual i of gender g = {f,m} and education j = {e, u} at age 1. Other variables are
defined analogously. Note the value functions at age 1 are the discounted present value of one-period
utilities given wages over time until age N . The value functions at age zero are,
• Uneducated Agent:
V g,0s,u = Us(ct, ht) + βE
{
pgu,t+1
[
pgu,e?,t+1V
g,1
p,u,e? + p
g
u,u?,t+1V
g,1
p,u,u?
]
+ (1− pgu,t+1)V g,1s,u
}
(20)
• Educated Agent:
V g,0s,e = −η1bη2i + βE
{
pge,t+1
[
pge,e?,t+1V
g,1
p,e,e? + p
g
e,u?,t+1V
g,1
p,e,u?
]
+ (1− pge,t+1)V g,1s,e
}
(21)
Therefore, singles educated if and only if:
V g,0s,e ≥ V g,0s,u . (22)
Note, there are two benefits from education, (1) higher wages in future periods, (2) assortative
matching in marriage, pge,e?,t+1 > p
g
e,u?,t+1.
4.4 Production
Agents supply two labor inputs, brain and brawn to the labor market. The aggregate production
function has constant elasticity of substitution in the two inputs, Bt and Rt (the aggregate labor
supplies of brain and brawn),
Yt = Zt
(
γtB
φ
t + (1− γt)Rφt
)1/φ
, (23)
where Zt is aggregate productivity, γt is the share parameter on brain and φ = 11−φ is the elasticity
of substitution between the two inputs. A rise in γt over time represents the exogenous BBTC.
The relative wage rate for brain and brawn follows from the cost minimization of the final good,
wt =
wb,t
wr,t
=
γt
1− γt
(
Bt
Rt
)φ−1
. (24)
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The relative wage is a function of relative factor productivity as well as relative quantities supplied.
Using equation (24), and the aggregate production function (23), and normalizing, the final goods
price to one, wage rates are,
wb,t = Zt
[
γ
φ−1
t +
(
1− γt
wt
)φ−1]1/(φ−1)
, (25)
and
wr,t = Zt
[(
γt
wt
)φ−1
+ (1− γt)φ−1
]1/(φ−1)
. (26)
Any technical change, defined as a change in γt, mimicking the movement from brawn-intensive
to brain-intensive production must increase the relative demand for the brain-intensive efficiency
units of labor. From (24) relative demand is,
Bt
Rt
=
(
γtwr,t
(1− γt)wb,t
)φ−1
. (27)
Therefore, a rise in γt leads to the following proposition, a rise in relative brain demand if and only
if φ > 1, implying the two inputs are substitutes in the aggregate production process, since
∂BR
∂γ
= (φ − 1)X, (28)
where X > 0. Thus, the relative quantity of brain to brawn-intensive labor efficiency units at
any given wage ratio increases, and, as a consequence, the equilibrium wage wb,twr,t rises as long as
an outward shift in labor supply does not offset the increase in labor demand. The relative wage
equation (24) shows that a rise in BtRt will offset relative demand increases since (φ− 1) < 0.
4.5 Wages and the Distribution of Brain and Brawn
We can now explicitly state an agent’s wage, ωi,t, which is determined by his/her innate brain
and brawn ability. From the firm’s problem it follows that ωi,t = {wbbi,tei, wrri,t} for ei = {0, e}.
Moreover, brain and brawn are jointly distributed (bi, ri) ∼ Ag(b, r) with differing distributions by
gender. Since the premise of this study is the lack of women’s brawn, the two gender distributions,
Am(b, r) and Af (b, r), only differ in their distribution of brawn, rg. Consequently, the distribution
of brain, B, and the correlation of brain and brawn, ρ, are identical for men and women.
4.6 Decentralized Equilibrium
An equilibrium, given wages {wb, wr}, exists and is defined by:
1. The demand for market goods, ci, the production of household goods, hi, and the supply of
labor, `gi , that maximizes household utility;
2. The demand for labor inputs, B and R, that minimizes the final good’s cost function; and
3. Factor returns, {wb, wr} that clear,
(a) The labor market, Bhh = B and Rhh = R; and
(b) The goods market, Chh = Y ,
where Bhh, Rhh, and Chh are aggregate household supply and demand levels obtained by
integrating labor demand and market consumption of individuals over the brain and brawn
distribution of all working agents.
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5 Calibration
Simulating the model over time requires the calibration of individuals’ brain and brawn distri-
butions, and several household and production parameters. Given the pronounced hump-shape in
the wage gap between 1940 and 1950, possibly due to the effects of World War II, the model is
matched to various 1950 data targets.
5.1 Production Parameter Estimation
To determine the substitution parameter, φ, the regression of Katz and Murphy (1992, pg. 69)
is re-estimated, where skilled labor is defined as brain labor and unskilled labor is defined as brawn
labor. To determine brain and brawn labor inputs, assumptions regarding the matching of workers
to job, given that the DOT only provides information on job requirements (not workers) have to be
made. I assume that on average workers match “efficiently” to jobs, that is the average occupation
wage for occupation j is,
wj,t = wb,tbbj + wr,trrj + j,t for all t, (29)
where b, r, are the total (largest) factor amount available, bj , rj are the brain and brawn factors
estimated in section 2,9 and j,t is an error term. Since, wb,tb and wr,tr are not sparely identifiable,
an assumption needs to be imposed to obtain brain and brawn returns over time. That is, (29)
can either be estimate for a base year, assuming wb,0 = wr, 0 = 1 to estimate b and r or the
regression (29) can be estimated for all t, implicitly assuming that average returns equal one. The
two assumptions produce very similar results and, therefore, only the results to the second are
provided. Note also that b and r are constant over time, similar to the data, i.e., it is conceivable
that b has grown over time, but given data availability it is impossible to verify or estimate. Figure
6, plots the estimates relative brain to brawn wage rates.
Note the wage rates are similar in “from” to the United States college wage premium, where
relative wages first fall until 1980 and than rise continuously. Since, it was assumed that on average
individuals match properly to occupations, the average brain and brawn efficiency units can be
computed as,
Eb,t =
∑
j
bbjLj,t, (30)
where Lj,t are employment shares of occupation j. In computing wage rates, we only take full-time-
full-year workers,10 while Lj,t includes all individuals with working hours of 260 per year. However,
individual’s are weighted by their Census/CPS weights and hours worked per year to compute total
factor supply.
The estimate the substitution parameter φ, I assumes a log-linear skill-biased technical change
over time,
ln
(
γt
1− γt
)
t
= ζ0 + ζ1t+ ηt, (31)
as in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (1997). Taking the natural logarithm of the relative
wage equation (24), and inserting equation (31), leads to the following regression estimation,
ln
(
wb
wr
)
t
= a1t+ a2 ln
(
Eb
Er
)
t
, (32)
9Recall, factors are normalized from zero to one, with the interpretation that a factor of zero uses zero percent
and a factor of 1 uses 100 percent of the largest possible factor available.
10Full-time-full-year workers are defined as working at least 1,400 hours per year (prior to 1976 only hours worked
prior to the survey week are recorded in the data).
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Figure 6: Relative Brain to Brawn Wage Rate
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where a2 = φ− 1. Table 1 provides the regression estimates for the DOT 1977,11
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
Production Parameters
Substitution Parameter φ 0.81818
95% Confidence Interval 0.73775 - 0.89861
Additionally, for the calibration γ1950 = .5 is set for the base year. For the simulation purposes γt
will evolve in two ways, either by a linear BBTC to match male college educated fraction in the
United States in 2005 or directly taken from the DOT estimates (see figure 7). Note, the two trends
are fairly similar, however, the DOT trend has a slight S-shape which will manifest itself in the
labor force participation time trend of married women.
5.2 Household Parameters
The remaining parameters {Ah, ps, c, ρ, µb, µfr , µmr , σb, σr} and the education parameters {e, η1, η2}
are matched to the data targets listed in Table 2. Brain and brawn distributions are assumed to be
jointly normal. In addition, ρ is set to zero, and µb is normalized to one. As in Guvenen and Kuruscu
11Naturally, in using different base years, the estimate of φ varies depending on the year selected. However, the
resulting estimates are within then range of the 95 percent confidence interval of the second method. In addition,
redoing the estimation for the DOT 1991, generates similar results as well, with φ = 0.86479 in the second method.
All these additional results are available from the author upon requests.
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Figure 7: BBTC
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(2009), the model abstracts form idiosyncratic shocks, which are present in the data. Therefore,
instead of matching the log wage variance in the United States data in calibrating the standard de-
viation of brain and brawn, I follow Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) in matching the residual variance
of 0.104, define as variance less idiosyncratic shocks.
Table 2: Moments and Parameter Estimates
Moment 1950s Data Model Parameter Estimates
Single Female LFP 0.63950 0.63586 Ah = 1.14583
Male LFP 0.92477 0.98433 ps = 0.6396
Married Uneducated Female LFP 0.25337 0.24195 c = 1.98750
Female Relative Minimum Wage 0.20624 0.20549 µfr = 1.45374
Gender Wage Gap 0.63900 0.64695 µmr = 3.51434
Variance in Log Wages 0.10400 0.10294 σr = 0.54387
Married Female LFP 0.25126 0.26438 σb = 0.13173
Male College Premium 1.49446 1.65686 e = 2.89371
Young Male Fraction Educated 0.10987 0.11950 η1 = 2.57255
Young Female Fraction Educated 0.07011 0.06554 η2 = 4.26093
The model does well in matching most data targets, expect the college wage premium for men,
which is over estimated in the model. Moreover, note that men have about twice as much brawn
than women, and the variance of brawn is considerable higher than the variance of brain. Lastly,
the model is able to generate a large difference in average female to male wages, where women earn
about 65 percent of men’s wages.
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Figure 8: Labor Force Participation of Women
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Parameters are obtained from preforming simulated annealing. To check the robustness of the
estimates, the calibration is repeated numerous times with different initial parameter values chosen
randomly from a grid of plausible values. The labor market trends discussed below are robust to
all calibrations.
6 Main Results
Assuming that average wages grow at 1 percent per year, in order for the model to generate
a large rise in female employment, I assume similar to Ngai and Pissarides (2008), that home
production grows at .04 percent slower. If home production grows at the same rate, the model only
generates about half of the observed rise in employment. Since, this study is mainly interested in
wage and education trends it is important to match the employment evolution. Moreover, a story
of technological improvement in the home as mentioned in the introduction, would be consistent
with such trends. The results presented in this section show that the mechanism highlighted in
this study does well in matching the market outcomes of women in the United States. In contrast,
a counterfactual model without education is unable to match the wage gap evolution beyond the
period of stagnant average female to male wages.
6.1 Simulated Employment and Wage Gap Trends
This model generates a linear rise in female labor force participation. The trend for married
women is S-shaped when using the BBTC of the DOT 1977 from Section 2 (labeled BBTC -
Data). The results of figure 12 are similar for all specifications, including the counterfactual without
education. Therefore, the rise in labor force participation is mainly due to the rise in the returns
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Figure 9: Simulated Wage Gap
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to brain, rather than the modeled educational choice. Men’s labor force participation is close to
full-employment in the model economy, but does decrease slight for married men over the time
period, similar as in the United States where male employment fell from 92 percent and 87 percent
in 1950 and 2005, respectively.
The model does also well in matching the wage gap evolution. While, the model does not
generate large fall in wages, it does have a considerable period of stagnated female wages (supply
effect dominates), before starting to close faster from the late 1970s onward (price and education
effect dominate).
Figure 10: Wage Gap Comparison
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(a) The Gender Wage Gap
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(b) Average Brain Supply
Moreover, while the technical change from the data generates a similar wage gap evolution the
counterfactual model without education fails in closing the gap between men and women. In the
counterfactual model the supply effect dominates throughout most of the period, and the price effect
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does not generate a sufficient positive effect failing to match the closing wage gap in the United
States.12
A large fraction of the stagnant wage gap in the counterfactual model is driven by the fact that
women’s average brain supply do not rise but rather fall over time. Figure 11(b) shows female
average brain supplies across the three models. Although women’s brain supply eventually exceeds
that of men in the data, the model without education is unable to generate this effect.
The model does also fairly well in matching the overall education trends, and the reversal of
the education gap over time. However, the results are slight over stated for young women and
understated for young men (see figure 12(a), left panel). Moreover, in the model the gap closes
much sooner than in the data. Clearly, the model being unable to generate the large rise in male
education (possibly due to Vietnam war) it also fails in matching the education trend for the whole
population (see figure 12(b), right panel). However, when comparing the education trends across
the two possible BBTC simulations, the model following the DOT 1977 estimates does generate a
somewhat larger result for men, while remaining fairly constant for women (see figure ??).
Figure 11: Education Trends
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To conclude the simulation results, the model also has prediction of variance of log wages over
time. While the model does generate some rise in the variance, it generates only about half of what
we observe in the data. Therefore, the current model specification still leaves a large component of
wage inequality unexplained.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to assess the importance of labor demand changes on women’s labor
force participation and wages. For proper policy development, it is necessary to establish the extent
to which the female labor market experience has been shaped by discrimination or other factors.
This study focuses on the changes in occupational brain and brawn input requirements, and their
effect on women’s labor force participation, education and average wages. A considerable rise in
brain and fall in brawn requirements is estimated from the 1977 DOT. The simulation of the general
equilibrium model provides further insight into the dynamics of these labor demand changes, and
their quantitative impact on women’s labor force participation, the reversal of the education gap,
12The model without education was not recalibrated and, therefore, the initial wage gap is slightly lower at 62
percentage points. For illustration purposes of the trends across models, it is graphed on the secondary y-axis.
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Figure 12: College Education Trend Comparison (Aged 20-25)
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and the closing wage gap. Calibrating the model to the 1950s United States economy shows that
BBTC is able to replicate the rise in female labor force participation. While the model without
education is unable to generate a closing wage gap, the base model with an educational choice is
able to generate a similar trend as observed in the data. This model generates both the initial
stagnation and later rise of the post-World War II United States wage gap. Moreover, education
trends generated in the model are consistent with United States trends for both men and women.
Clearly, the simple model presented in this paper, abstracting from many other potential factors
influencing men’s and women’s labor market experiences, is unable to explain the complete evolution
of the labor market over the last five decades. Nonetheless, this model is successful in explaining a
significant portion of the changes in women’s labor market experience.
Some questions remain for future research. The model has made some simplifying assumptions,
such as modeling skill-biased technical change as an exogenous process. The next research step is
endogenizing this process by developing a model where the entrance of women into the labor force
possibly spurs the skill-biased technological change observed in the data. Lastly, a cross-country
comparison to further test the validity of the BBTC hypothesis would be valuable in determining
the importance of labor demand requirements in policies fostering women’s well-being.
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Appendix A: Factor Estimation
I estimate brain and brawn requirements for United States census occupation and industry
classifications from the 1977 Dictionary of Occupational Title (DOT).13 This DOT survey set is
particularly useful since, (1) it is readily available in an electronic format, (2) it has been merged with
the 1971 Current Population Survey (CPS) allowing for civilian employment population weighted
results, and (3) it lies mid-way through the period under study (the late 1970s). To estimate brain
and brawn levels over time and gender I use factor analysis as in Ingram and Neumann (2006).
Factor analysis is a technique to reduce a large number of variables, called characteristics, within
a dataset to a few unobserved random variables, called factors. The 1977 DOT reports 38 job
characteristics for over 12,000 occupations (see Section 2 for detail on these characteristics). These
characteristics capture the heterogeneity across jobs and workers. While they measure different
specific job requirements, they can be grouped into broader categories of skills in terms of their
common underlying dimensions. This grouping reduces the dimensionality of heterogeneity allowing
factor requirements to be matched in a simple general equilibrium model.
Factor analysis uses the correlation matrix of a set of dependent variables to uncover the func-
tional form of some undefined independent variables. In the general specification the characteristics,
Ci, are modeled as linear combinations of the independent variables or factors, fi, plus an error term
i,
Ci = µ+ ΛFi + i for i=1,. . . , N, (A.1)
where N equals the number of occupations; Ci is the vector of characteristics (38 × 1); µ is the
vector of characteristic means (38× 1); Λ is a vector of coefficients (38× nf ) called factor loadings;
Fi = (f1, f2, · · · , fnf )′ is a vector of the factors (nf × 1); and i ∼ N(0,Σ) is the uncorrelated error
vector, with Σ being the diagonal variance covariance matrix.
To preform factor analysis certain variables of the DOT need to be rescaled, for example, the
variable documenting a job’s location is coded I=indoors, O=outdoors, and B=both indoors and
outdoors. I follow Vijverberg and Hartog (2005) in rescaling all variables. Additionally, to obtain
population representative estimates, the occupations in the DOT must be weighted. As the DOT
itself does not record the number of workers for a given job, the 1971 CPS merge is used. In the
1977 DOT, the Committee on Occupational Classification and Analysis of the National Academy of
Sciences funded by the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
merged the 12,431 1977 DOT jobs to 7,289 unique occupation-industry pairs from the 1970 United
States Census providing 1971 CPS weights of the civilian labor force. The reduction from 12,431
to 7,289 is the result of more detailed occupational classifications in the DOT. For example, while
there is only one “waiter/waitress” category in the census classification, the DOT contains multiple
categories, such as “waiter/waitress formal”, “waiter/waitress, head”, “waiter/waitress, take out.”
Since only information on the characteristics is available, this information is used to estimate
both, Λ and Fi from
E
(
Cˆ − µ
)(
Cˆ − µ
)′
= ΛE
(
Fˆ Fˆ ′
)
Λ′ + Σ, (A.2)
that is, the covariance in the 38 characteristics can be explained by a reduced number of factors,
where Cˆ = [C1C2 . . . CN ] and Fˆ = [F1F2 . . . FN ]. It is clear that Λ, E
(
Fˆ Fˆ ′
)
, and Σ are not
separately identifiable from this expression. Therefore, factor analysis generally assumes factors to
follow a standardized normal distribution, which allows for the identification of Σ. To separately
13Data, including documentation, is available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR).
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identify Λ and E
(
Fˆ Fˆ ′
)
additional restrictions must be imposed. In standard factor analysis the
covariance between factors is set to zero,
E(Fˆ Fˆ ′) =

1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0
. . .
0 · · · 1
 , (A.3)
allowing both Λ and Σ, which is diagonal by assumption, to be identified separately. In this
specification each characteristic is a function of all factors. In practice, the first factor estimate
will explain the maximum possible covariance between the characteristics. The second factor is
estimated to explain the maximum covariance remaining, and so on. A maximum of 38 factors
could be estimated, in which case 38 factors are necessary to explain the covariance between all
characteristics. In this study three factors explain most of the characteristics’ covariance structure
(over 93 percent of the total covariance).14 After preforming initial factor analysis as described
above, the first factor is positively related to intellectual characteristics and negatively correlated
with both motor coordination and physical characteristics, making it difficult to interpret the factor
consistently. Therefore, I reestimate the factors assuming they are correlated, similarly to Ingram
and Neumann (2006). However, for identification purposes, job characteristics that explain one
factor are restricted and cannot explain another factor. For example, mathematical development
only explains a job’s intellectual requirements directly, while it is only informative on the job’s
physical requirements through the correlation of the aggregate brain and brawn factor. Table A.1
provides the classification of characteristics across factors as well as the factor loading coefficients,
which are used to determine factor estimates for each occupation-industry combination present in
the 1971 CPS. Given the grouping of characteristics and the estimates of factor loadings, I call the
three factors brain, motor coordination, and brawn. Brain, brawn, and motor coordination trends
over time (see Figure 4) are robust to either the standard identification restriction of uncorrelated
factors or my reestimated identification of correlated factors.
14Ingram and Neumann use the 1991 DOT with over 53 characteristics, primarily expanded by detailing physical
and environmental characteristics, to estimate a total of four factors: (1) intelligence, (2) clerical skill, (3) gross motor
skill, and (4) ability to deal with physically and hazardous work.
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Table A.1: Factor Loading Estimates (Λ)
Job Characteristic Coefficient (Λi)
Brawn Factor
Repetitive Work 0.30406
Climbing/Balancing 0.77651
Stooping/Kneeling/Crouching/Crawling 0.81000
Strength Requirement 0.88075
Environmental Exposure15 0.77673
Indoor or Outdoor Work 0.68110
Brain Factor
Reasoning Development 0.96668
Mathematical Development 0.89217
Language Development 0.95275
Specific Vocational Preparation 0.77567
General Intelligence 0.94685
Verbal Aptitude 0.94068
Numerical Aptitude 0.83968
Clerical Aptitude 0.70447
Talking and Hearing 0.57950
Performs Variety of Duties 0.24961
Directing/Controlling 0.61560
Interpreting Feelings/Ideas/Facts 0.18598
Influencing People 0.37265
Making Evaluations Based on Judgment 0.60055
Making Judgments/Decisions 0.43480
Dealing with People 0.49332
Motor Coordination Factor
Seeing 0.77650
Spatial Aptitude 0.43418
Form Perception 0.71349
Motor Coordination 0.84869
Finger Dexterity 0.88302
Manual Dexterity 0.66313
Eye-Hand-Foot Coordination 0.07607
Color Discrimination 0.37763
Attaining Precise Tolerances 0.72865
Reaching/Handling/Fingering/Feeling 0.50627
Making Decisions based on Measurable Criteria 0.30894
Notes: Estimated using maximum-likelihood factor analysis.
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